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Research has consistently shown negative effects of multitasking on tasks such as problem solving. 
This study was designed to investigate the impact of an incentive when solving problems in a mul-
titasking situation. Incentives have generally been shown to increase problem solving (e.g., Wieth & 
Burns, 2006), however, it is unclear whether an incentive can increase problem solving while atten-
tional resources are divided. Participants were either given an incentive or not and asked to complete 
incremental and insight problems while either in a dual-task or single task condition. After solving 
the problems participants were given a surprise memory test. Results showed that the incentive only 
led to increases in problem solving in the single task condition but not the dual-task condition. Fur-
thermore, results showed that an incentive in the dual-task condition led to an increase in recall of 
irrelevant information. These findings indicate that an incentive cannot ameliorate the detrimental 
effects of multitasking when problem solving and may even lead to an increase in irrelevant informa-
tion processing.
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The ability to problem solve is often seen as an essential skill 
for individuals to succeed in today’s world. The new Com-
mon Core State Standards Initiative, an educational initiative 
for grades K–12 in the United States, was designed to enhance 
students’ problem solving and critical thinking skills, which 
are mentioned as crucial for entry-level careers, first-year 
college courses, and workforce training programs (Common 
Core State Standards Initiative, 2014). Indeed, problem solv-
ing ability has been reported as one of the top two job skills 
that employers are looking for when hiring (Casserly, 2012). 
Given the emphasis that has been placed on problem solving 
in educational and career settings, it is surprising that rather 
than focusing solely on solving a problem, many students and 
workers will engage in problem solving activities while also 
performing other tasks such as checking e-mail or watching 
TV. Indeed, simultaneously attending to multiple streams of 
information while working or studying has become an in-
creasingly common behavior among younger individuals, 
such as college students (Rosen, Carrier, & Cheever, 2013). 
Rideout, Foehr, and Roberts (2010), in a report written by 
for the Kaiser Family Foundation, found that almost a third 
of the students surveyed said that when they were writing a 
paper or completing a problem, “most of the time” they were 
also watching TV, texting, listening to music, or using some 
other medium. Similarly, a national survey of 2,000 U.S. in-
formation workers showed that 92 percent of respondents 
confessed to multitasking during meetings and 41 percent 
admit to doing so “often” or “all the time” (FuzeBox, 2014). 
Incidence of multitasking continues to increase despite 
research consistently showing adverse impacts on task 
performance when switching between two cognitively de-
manding tasks or attempting to divide attentional resources 
to perform two tasks at once. For example, Bowman, Levine, 
Waite, and Dendron (2010) found that students, who were 
chatting via instant messenger while reading a passage from 
a textbook took significantly more time to read the passage 
than students who were engaging in the reading task alone. 
Similarly, reading comprehension and memory have been 
shown to be significantly reduced in students completing aca-
demic work while watching television (Armstrong, Boiarsky, 
& Mares, 1991; Pool, Koolstra, & van der Voort, 2003). Like-
wise, costs associated with switching between two tasks have 
been established in the literature (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 
1995; Meuter & Allport, 1999; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 
2001; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). For example, Rubinstein, Ev-
ans, and Meyer (2001) asked participants to switch between 
different tasks such as classifying geometric objects and solv-
ing math problems. For all tasks, the participants lost time 
when they had to switch from one task to another. As tasks 
got more complex, switch cost increased. Moreover, Rogers 
and Monsell (1995) found that even when participants were 
asked to make a completely predictable switch between two 
tasks every two or four trials, they were still slower on task-
switch than on task-repeat trials. Additionally, increasing the 
time available between trials for preparation reduced but did 
not eliminate the cost of switching. These findings indicate 
that switch costs do not simply occur because of time con-
straints but are also linked to limits in attentional resources. 
When looking at the effect of added cognitive load on 
problem solving in particular, similar negative impacts on 
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performance have been seen. For example, Logie, Gilhooly, 
and Wynn (1994) found that performance on a mental ad-
dition task was significantly reduced when participants were 
asked to also perform a variety of secondary tasks (e.g., con-
current random letter generation, articulatory suppression). 
Similar results were found by Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick, and 
Wynn (1993) for a syllogistic reasoning task. Investigating 
everyday problem solving, Goddard, Dritschel, and Burton 
(1998) found reduced performance on the Means-End Prob-
lem Solving (MEPS) task when participants were asked to 
perform a letter response task while listing solutions to daily 
social problems. Investigating the impact of a secondary task 
on different types of problem solving processes, Lin and Lien 
(2013) had participants perform a version of the Wason’s 2-4-
6 task as well as a Torrence Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT) 
while reading aloud a series of consecutive integers. Results 
showed significantly lower accuracy on the 2-4-6 task for par-
ticipants in the dual-task condition compared to participants 
in the single-task condition. The reverse effect was found for 
the Creative thinking test (TTCT). Participants in the dual-
task condition showed greater performance on many of the 
measures of the Creative thinking test (especially those re-
lated to the number of generated responses) compared to 
participants in the single task condition. Likewise, Lavric, 
Forstmeier, and Rippon (2000) found evidence for decre-
ments in task performance for an incremental problem but 
not for an insight problem. Lavric et al. had participants solve 
the Wason card selection task (incremental problem) and 
Duncker’s candle problem (insight problem) while concur-
rently counting auditory stimuli. Decrements were seen for 
the Wason card selection task but not for Duncker’s candle 
problem, indicating that there may be an advantage to re-
duced attentional processing for tasks involving creativity 
as seen in Wieth and Zacks (2011) and Jarosz, Colflesh, and 
Wiley (2012) (see Van Stockum & DeCaro, 2014 for research 
showing detrimental effects of increased attentional process-
ing when solving insight problems). Overall though, research 
consistently indicates that multitasking situations pose an at-
tention allocation problem where limited resources have to 
be distributed across various tasks to meet some criterion of 
performance. When the task demands outweigh the available 
attentional resources, generally decrements in performance 
are seen. In particular, Wickens (1980, 1984) proposed a 
three-dimensional space of task characteristics (stages of pro-
cessing, codes, and modalities) that determines interference 
between tasks. Greater overlap in attentional requirements 
between two tasks leads to performance decrements in both 
tasks if participants are performing the tasks simultaneously. 
If more attention is allocated to one over the other task then 
greater decrements will be seen in one task.
Kahneman (1973) argued that an individual’s enduring 
dispositions, momentary intentions, and evaluation of the 
capacity demands will influence the allocation of attentional 
resources. Those tasks that are seen as more appealing, inter-
esting, or important receive more attention than tasks seen as 
unappealing, boring, and unimportant. One way of chang-
ing the appeal of a task is to associate an incentive with the 
completion of the task. For example, when looking at worker 
productivity LaMere, Dickinson, Henry, Henry, and Poling 
(1996) found that truck drivers increased their productivity 
after an incentive pay system was introduced which rewarded 
the drivers for accomplishing each job they had to perform 
(e.g., delivering goods, loading and unloading goods) com-
pared to a base rate system of pay (a set hourly wage). This 
increase in productivity was sustained over a period of nearly 
four years and was not accompanied by worker dissatisfac-
tion or increases in accidents. Similarly, Saari and Latham 
(1982) studied the performance of beaver trappers before the 
implementation of an incentive plan and under the incentive 
plan. It was found that the number of rodents trapped per 
hour increased significantly under the incentive plan (pay-
ment for each beaver trapped) compared to the base rate sys-
tem of pay (a set hourly wage), which was in place before 
the incentive plan. Investigating the impact of an incentive 
on problem solving, Glucksberg (1962) found that incentives 
increased problem solving performance on an easy version 
of Duncker’s candle problem (the tacks had already been re-
moved from the tack box) but decreased problem solving on 
the regular version of the problem (for a similar detrimental 
incentive effect on the Luchins Water Jar task see McGraw & 
McCullers, 1979). Wieth and Burns (2006), however, found 
that incentives led to increases in incremental and insight 
problem solving. More specifically, participants that were 
given an incentive (the opportunity to leave the experiment 
early) had greater problem solving rates than those not given 
the incentive. Additionally, Wieth and Burns found that par-
ticipants in the incentive condition had greater memory for 
the problems than participants not given an incentive. These 
findings indicate that an incentive may indeed influence per-
formance by altering attention allocation, as proposed by 
Kahneman (1973). (Similar changes in attention allocation 
while solving an object assignment problem have been seen 
when using a penalty points system [Taatgen, 2011]).
Current Study
The primary goal of the current study is to investigate how 
an incentive influences problem solving while engaging in a 
multitasking situation. Charon and Koechlin (2010) showed 
that incentives can alter participants’ attention allocation on 
concurrently performed letter judgment tasks. More specifi-
cally, Charron and Koechlin had participants perform letter 
sequencing tasks where participants had to judge whether 
two successively presented letters are also in immediate 
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succession in the word “tablet” on each trial. Each task (pri-
mary and secondary) was assigned either a small incentive 
(€0.04) or a large inventive (€1.0), with the assigned value 
changing throughout the experiment. Charron and Koechlin 
found that participants’ performance changed based on the 
amount of the incentive such that performance improved as 
the incentive increased. Given that attention allocation could 
be controlled with an incentive, we used a dual task, or mul-
titasking approach, to study how incentives affect problem 
solving when performing two tasks at once. Based on Char-
ron and Koechlin’s (2010) finding that incentives can change 
performance on a primary task even when a second task is 
present, it is hypothesized that an incentive will cause par-
ticipants to shift their attentional resources to the rewarded 
task (problem solving in this case) and away from the non-
rewarded task. If this is the case then participants given an 
incentive in the dual-task condition should show greater 
problem solving performance but have lower secondary task 
performance than participants not given an incentive. On the 
other hand, problem solving entails more attention than the 
letter sequencing task used by Charron and Koechlin (2010). 
Indeed, problem solving is an activity that requires a great 
deal of attentional resources (Hambrick & Engle, 2003). Per-
haps by adding a secondary task that the brain cannot easily 
ignore (a tone monitoring task), the brain’s attentional re-
sources are at their maximum capacity and therefore cannot 
be easily manipulated. Thus, an incentive may not be able to 
have an impact on problem solving in a multitasking setting 
because of the limited additional resources available. If this is 
the case then an incentive will have no effect on participants 
engaging in the secondary task while problem solving; the 
usual detriments of multitasking should be seen. 
A secondary goal of this study is to investigate how an 
incentive may impact memory for problems in a multitask-
ing situation. As discussed above, studies have consistently 
shown a decrease in memory when engaging in more than 
one task at a time (e.g., Armstrong, Boiarsky, & Mares, 1991; 
Pool, Koolstra, & van der Voort, 2003). These findings are 
consistent with Logan and Etherton (1994) who provided 
evidence that attention is crucial for memory. More specifi-
cally, some participants were told to pay attention to both 
words in a word pair to make a series of judgments while 
others were told to focus on the colored word in the pair. 
Results showed that participants that focused on both words 
showed a performance advantage from the consistent pair-
ing but participants that focused on the colored word did 
not. Perhaps this is also how an incentive influences prob-
lem solving when multitasking. The incentive might serve 
the same function as the color cue and direct participants’ 
attention to the information that is perceived as relevant in 
the rewarded task, especially when attentional resources are 
limited due to performing more than one task at a time. It 
is therefore hypothesized that participants in the dual-task 
condition given an incentive will remember more problem 
relevant information than irrelevant information It is also 
possible, however, that problem solving is so attentionally 
demanding that only surface level processing will occur 
when presented in a dual-task context, regardless of pre-
sented incentive. Foerde, Knowlton, and Poldrack (2006) 
found that a dual-task condition (tone counting) led to an 
increase in habitual learning and a decrease in declarative 
learning during a weather prediction task. Participants’ ac-
curacy on the weather prediction task in the dual-task trials 
did not decrease compared to the single task trials, however, 
results for the cue prediction task immediately following the 
weather prediction task showed less flexible and more ha-
bitual learning for those cues learned during the dual-task 
trials compared to the single task trials. It is possible that 
an incentive in the dual-task condition will increase atten-
tion to surface level features without increasing attention to 
relevant meaning in the problem, since the problem solving 
is so taxing. Increased attention to the surface level, but not 
relevant meaning, would lead to more habitual learning or 
direct memorization of the problem. For example, Ophir, 
Nass, and Wagner (2009) found that heavy media multi-
taskers had greater difficulty filtering out irrelevant stimu-
li from their environment in a filter task and a distracters 
task, were less likely to ignore irrelevant representations in 
memory in a two- and three-back task, and were less ef-
fective in suppressing the activation of irrelevant task sets 
when task-switching compared to lighter media multitask-
ers. An incentive in a dual-task situation may therefore only 
increase the likelihood that participants will direct attention 
to overall surface processing without being able to discrimi-
nate between relevant and irrelevant information. In order 
to test the impact of an incentive on memory in a multitask-
ing situation we added irrelevant information to all word 
problems that our participants were asked to complete. Ad-
ditionally, despite the null effects of incentives on problem 
type seen in previous research (Wieth & Burns, 2006), we 
included both incremental and insight problems in this 
study due to previous research showing differences in the 
impact of a secondary task on problems involving creativity 
(e.g., Lavric, Forstmeier, & Rippon 2000). However, given 
that we used similar problems to those used in Wieth and 
Burns we did not expect to see a difference in how the in-
centive would impact the incremental and insight problems.
In order to test our hypotheses participants were either 
given an incentive or not and asked to solve incremental and 
insight problems with irrelevant information added. Half of 
the participants simply solved the problems while the other 
half solved the problems while concurrently performing a 
tone monitoring task. After completing the problems par-
ticipants were given a surprise memory test.
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Three hundred and twenty Michigan State University stu-
dents participated for course credit (mean age 19.62). 
MaterialS
Incentive
The incentive was the opportunity to leave the experiment 
early if participants solved four problems correctly.  Wieth and 
Burns (2006) showed that this is an effective incentive that im-
proves problem solving performance in college aged students.
Problems
Using a computer, participants were potentially given three 
incremental (age, water, and job problem) and three insight 
problems (month, matchstick, and prisoner problem). Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to receive the first four 
problems in one of four different orders such that partici-
pants received the two incremental problems (age and water) 
and the two insight problems (month and matchstick) in an 
alternating fashion. Each of the four problems was modified 
to include one piece of irrelevant information. For example, 
in the following problem: “Ann is twice as old as her son. 
They were both born in June. Ten years ago Ann was three 
times as old as her son. What are their present ages?” The 
information that Ann and her son were both born in June is 
not needed to solve the problem. A pilot study showed that 
participants consistently rated the added information as less 
relevant for solving the problem than relevant components 
of the problems. The last two problems (job and prisoner) 
were not modified to include irrelevant information because 
they were not used in any analyses due to the structure of the 
incentive. The text and solution rates of all problems can be 
found in the Appendix.
Secondary Task
Participants were asked to perform a concurrent tone moni-
toring task (based on Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, & Carr; 
2004). They were randomly assigned a 500 ms duration 
computer-generated target tone of 300 Hz or 1500 Hz. They 
heard a tone every two seconds and were instructed to press 
a foot pedal when they heard the target tone. 
ProCedure
Equal numbers of participants were randomly assigned to 
either the incentive or non-incentive and either single task 
or dual-task conditions. Participants were first given an in-
formed consent document outlining the experiment and 
their rights as a participant. Following the consent proce-
dure, participants were given an overview of the experiment 
including an example problem. Participants in the incentive 
condition were informed of the incentive and everyone was 
told that they would have four minutes to solve each prob-
lem. In neither the single or dual-task condition were partici-
pants told how many problems comprised this experiment. If 
participants asked they were simply told that the experiment 
would take them the whole experimental hour to complete.
All participants, regardless of condition, then completed a 
two-minute practice tone monitoring task. Each participant 
put on headphones and a target tone was played three times at 
an interval of one tone every two seconds. Participants were 
asked to press a foot pedal every time they heard the target 
tone. If a participant’s hit rate was less than ninety percent 
they were asked to listen to the target tone again and repeat 
the practice task. After successfully completing the practice 
tone task, participants were given the tone monitoring task 
for four minutes to measure their baseline performance. 
Single-Task Condition
Participants in the single task were then given an easy incre-
mental practice problem (dinner party problem) and were re-
minded of the problem solving instructions. After complet-
ing the easy incremental problem they were given a chance 
to ask questions. They then completed up to six problems 
(three incremental and three insight). 
Dual-Task Condition
Participants in the dual-task also completed the easy incre-
mental problem and were told that they should perform the 
problem solving task and the tone task simultaneously, tak-
ing care to complete both. After completing the easy incre-
mental problem (dinner party problem) concurrently with 
the tone task they were given a chance to ask questions. They 
then completed up to six problems (three incremental and 
three insight) while performing the tone monitoring task. 
Between problems they were given the option to listen to 
their target tone again. 
After attempting four problems, all participants (regard-
less of condition) were presented with a surprise memory 
question that asked to write down as many details of each 
problem as they could remember. There was no time limit for 
this question and participants were not presented with tones. 
They then continued to solve problems, if necessary. 
reSultS
ProbleM Solving PerforManCe
Only the first four problems were analyzed because partici-
pants in the incentive condition might not have attempted 
any other problems. An incremental problem solving score 
was calculated as the proportion correct of the two incre-
mental problems, and an insight problem solving score as 
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the proportion correct of the two insight problems. Note 
that although the data are categorical, an analysis of variance 
rather than a loglinear modeling analysis was used. Lunney’s 
(1970) simulations show that ANOVA is a valid analysis for 
categorical data with large sample sizes and an equal number 
of participants in each condition. Using an ANOVA one can 
take advantage of the fact that participants did more than 
one problem, which is more problematic for loglinear analy-
sis with its strong assumption of independence.
A 2x2x2 ANOVA was performed on the incremental and 
insight scores with between-subjects factors of task (single or 
dual) and incentive (given or not), and a within-subjects fac-
tor of problem type (insight and incremental). There was a 
significant effect of task (F[1, 316] = 17.36, p < .01, ηp2 = .052), 
indicating the dual-task condition decreased performance, 
and a significant effect for incentive, such that participants 
given an incentive outperformed those not given an incentive 
(F[1, 316] = 5.25, p = .02, ηp2 = .016). These effects, however, 
were qualified by a significant interaction between incentive 
and task (F[1, 316] = 3.92, p = .049, ηp2 = .012). Post-hoc tests 
showed that the incentive increased problem solving perfor-
mance in the single-task condition (t[158] = 2.94, p = .004, 
d = .47) but not in the dual-task condition (t[158] = .23, p = 
.82, d = .04). See Figure 1 and Table 1 for means. 
There was a significant main effect of type of problem 
(F[1, 316] = 51.92, p < .01, ηp2 = .141), such that participants 
were more successful at solving incremental problems than 
insight problems. However, there were no significant in-
teractions with problem type indicating that the dual-task 
and the incentive did not influence incremental and insight 
problems differently. No other interactions were significant. 
In addition the data investigating the impact of an incen-
tive on problem solving success in the dual task condition 
and the single task condition was examined by estimating a 
Bayes factor for each of the two comparisons. Using Bayes-
ian Information Criteria (Wagenmaker, 2007) the fit of the 
data under the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis 
are compared. Looking at the impact of the incentive in the 
single task condition an estimated Bayes factor (null/alterna-
tive) suggests that the data are .15:1 in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis, or rather, 6.67 times more likely to occur under 
a model including an effect of incentive, rather than a model 
without it. On the other hand, looking at the impact of the 
incentive in the dual-task condition an estimated Bayes fac-
tor (null/alternative) suggests that the data are 12.28:1 in fa-
vor of the alternative hypothesis, or rather, .08 times more 
likely to occur under the model including an effect of incen-
tive, rather than a model without it. Overall these results 
show that the incentive led to an increase in problem solving 
performance only in the single task condition while show-
ing little to no impact of an incentive while solving problems 
when multitasking (showing the usual detrimental effects of 
multitasking on problem solving).
Figure 1. 
Mean problem solution rate for participants in the single and 
dual-task conditions across incentive. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean.
Table 1. 
Mean incremental and insight problem solving scores (standard deviations in parentheses) for participants in the single and 
dual-task conditions divided by incentive.
Incremental Insight Overall
Single Task
Non-incentive (n = 80) .53 (.34) .36 (.33) .44 (.24)
Incentive (n = 80) .66 (.36) .48 (.39) .57 (.31)
Total (n = 160) .60 (.36) .42 (.37) .51 (.28)
Dual Task
Non-incentive (n = 80) .47 (.36) .29 (.32) .38 (.25)
Incentive (n = 80) .48 (.36) .29 (.33) .39 (.27)
Total (n = 160) .48 (.36) .29 (.32) .38 (.26)
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SeCondary taSk PerforManCe
Performance on the secondary task was evaluated to deter-
mine how dual-task participants were allocating their at-
tentional resources. Tone detection accuracy for when par-
ticipants were performing the tone task only, performing 
the tone task while solving incremental problems, and while 
solving insight problems was calculated by subtracting partic-
ipants’ proportion of tones incorrectly judged to be the target 
tone from their proportion of target tones correctly identified. 
A 2x3 ANOVA was run on the accuracy measure with 
a between subject factor of incentive (given or not) and a 
within subjects factor of tone type (tone only baseline, tone 
incremental, and tone insight). See Table 2 for means. There 
was a main effect of tone type (F[2, 316] = 129.49, p <.01, 
ηp2 = .453), such that participants were more accurate when 
performing the tone task alone than when solving incremen-
tal problems, t(159) = 14.47, p < .01, d = .2.30, and insight 
problems, t(159) = 11.35, p < .01, d = 1.80. Tone task accu-
racy did not differ between incremental and insight problem 
solving (t[159] = .81, p = .21, d = .13). There was no incentive 
effect (F[1, 158] = .41, p = .52, ηp2 = .003) nor an interaction 
between it and tone type (F[2, 316] = .38, p = .69, ηp2 = .003). 
See Figure 2 for means. Thus the incentive did not influence 
tone monitoring accuracy. 
Looking at the impact of the incentive on tone monitoring 
by estimating a Bayes factor (null/alternative), it was found 
that the data are 219.89:1 in favor of the alternative hypoth-
esis, or rather, .005 times more likely to occur under the 
model including an effect of incentive, rather than the model 
without it. A similar overall pattern of results was found for 
tone monitoring response time. See Figure 3.
These findings indicate that participants’ ability to per-
form the tone task is influenced by concurrent problem 
solving but not the incentive. Perhaps incentives cause an 
increase in attention to the rewarded task only when addi-
tional or spare resources are available to the solver. When 
participants do not have any additional attentional resources 
Table 2.
Tone task performance means for accuracy and response times (in msec), by tone type: tone only (baseline collected before start of 
problem solving), insight (collected during insight problem solving) and incremental (collected during incremental problem solving). 
Incremental Insight Tone Only
Accuracy
Non-incentive (n = 80) .73 (.20) .76 (.26) .97 (.11)
Incentive (n = 80) .75 (.22) .78 (.20) .97 (.13)
Total (n = 160) .74 (.21) .77 (.23) .97 (.12)
Response Time
Non-incentive (n = 80) 962 (159) 963 (168) 734 (231)
Incentive (n = 80) 950 (165) 932 (189) 715 (214)
Total (n = 160) 956 (162) 948 (179) 725 (222)
Figure 2. 
Tone task performance means for accuracy by tone type: tone 
only (baseline collected before start of problem solving), in-
sight problems (collected during insight problem solving) and 
incremental problems (collected during incremental problem 
solving). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Tone task performance means for response times (in msec) by tone 
type: tone only (baseline collected before start of problem solving), 
insight problems (collected during insight problem solving) and 
incremental problems (collected during incremental problem solv-
ing). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3.  
Tone task p rforman e means for response times (in msec) by tone type: tone only (baseline 
collected before start of problem solving), insight problems (collected during insight roblem solving) 
and incremental problems (collected during incremental problem solving). Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. 
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that can be shifted (as in the dual-task condition) incentives 
may not have an impact on problem solving performance. 
MeMory 
In order to determine the impact of an incentive on problem 
solving in a dual-task situation, a problem memory measure 
was created by scoring participants’ responses to the memory 
question for the amount of detail given for each problem. Two 
raters, blind to condition, independently scored each of the 
problem responses on a rating scale ranging from 1 to 4 (1 = 
very little or no detail about a problem, 4 = all or almost all 
the details of a problem). If participants did not mention a 
problem a score of 0 was assigned for that particular problem. 
Inter-rater reliability was found to be satisfactory (K = .89). 
A 2x2x2 ANOVA was performed on the problem memory 
measure with between subjects factors of task (single or dual), 
incentive (given or not), and a within subjects factor of prob-
lem type (incremental and insight). See Table 3 for means. 
There was an effect for task, F(1, 316) = 5.87, p = .02, ηp2 = 
.016 showing the expected decrease in memory for problem 
details in the dual task compared to the single task condition. 
There was also an effect of incentive (F[1, 316] = 7.92, p = 
.005, ηp2 = .024), such that participants in the incentive condi-
tion remembered more problem details than participants in 
the non-incentive condition. See Figure 4 for means. 
There was no effect of problem type (p = .115), or any sig-
nificant interactions. Examining the impact of an incentive 
on problem memory by estimating a Bayes factor shows that 
the data were .25:1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, or 
rather, 4 times more likely to occur under the model includ-
ing an effect of incentive, rather than the model without it. 
The finding that participants in the dual-task condition given 
an incentive remember more problem details than those not 
given an incentive indicates that the incentive is somehow 
changing how participants are processing the information. 
Irrelevant information
Participants’ memory data was scored for recall of the piece 
of irrelevant information in each problem. If a participant’s 
problem recall contained the irrelevant information it was 
scored as a 1, if it did not it was scored as a 0. An irrelevant 
incremental-score and irrelevant insight-score were then 
calculated by averaging across the appropriate problems. 
A 2x2x2 ANOVA was run on the irrelevant scores with 
between subjects factors of task (single or dual) and incen-
tive (given or not) and a within subjects factor of problem 
type (incremental and insight). For means see Table 4. There 
was no effect of task (F[1, 316] = .24, p = .63, ηp2 = .001) nor 
an effect of incentive (F[1, 316] = .36, p = .55, ηp2 = .001). 
There was an effect for problem type (F[1, 316] = 20.34, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .060) such that participants remembered more ir-
relevant information for insight than incremental problems. 
Insight problems tend to be shorter which might have led 
participants to remember them more. It is important to note 
however, that problem type did not significantly interact 
with incentive (p = .69) nor task (p = .18). 
There was a significant interaction between task and in-
centive (F[1, 316] = 6.52, p = .01, ηp2 = .020). Post-hoc tests 
Table 3. 
Mean problem memory scores for incremental and insight problems (standard deviations in parentheses) in the single and dual-
task incentive and non-incentive conditions.
Incremental Insight Overall
Single Task
Non-incentive (n = 80) 2.35 (1.19) 2.50 (1.19) 2.43 (1.01)
Incentive (n = 80) 2.58 (1.33) 2.73 (1.12) 2.65 (1.07)
Total (n = 160) 2.46 (1.26) 2.62 (1.16) 2.54 (1.04)
Dual Task
Non-incentive (n = 80) 1.97 (1.31) 2.08 (1.28) 2.03 (1.10)
Incentive (n = 80) 2.47 (1.28) 2.48 (1.23) 2.48 (1.25)
Total (n = 160) 2.21 (1.32) 2.28 (1.27) 2.25 (1.12)
Figure 4.
Mean problem memory score for participants in the single 
and dual-task conditions across incentive. Error bars represent 
the standard error of the mean.
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revealed that in the dual-task condition participants given an 
incentive recalled more pieces of irrelevant information than 
participants not given an incentive (t[158] = 2.26, p = .03, d = 
.36), however there was no significant effect in the single task 
condition (t[158] = 1.43, p = .16, d = .23) although the trend 
was in the opposite direction. See Figure 5.
All other interactions were not significant. In addition, the 
data investigating the impact of an incentive on the recall of 
irrelevant information in the dual-task condition and the ef-
fect of an incentive in the single task condition were exam-
ined by estimating Bayes factors for each analysis. For the 
effect of an incentive on memory for irrelevant information 
in the dual-task condition the estimated Bayes factor (null/
alternative) is .50:1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, or 
rather, 2 times more likely to occur under the model includ-
ing an effect of an incentive, rather than a model without it. 
Alternatively, for the effect of an incentive on memory for 
irrelevant information in the single task condition the esti-
mated Byes factor (null/alternative) is 4.50:1, or rather .22 
times more likely to occur under the model including an ef-
fect of an incentive, rather than a model without it. 
diSCuSSion
The aims of this study were to examine whether an incentive 
can have an impact on problem solving while in a multitask-
ing situation. Our study’s results showed an improvement 
due to an incentive only in the single-task condition. In addi-
tion, performance decrements were also seen in the second-
ary task (tone task) regardless of incentive condition. These 
findings indicate that an incentive is not able to override the 
attentional limits present in the system and therefore cannot 
ameliorate the negative effects of multitasking while problem 
solving. Participants, though seemingly interested in meet-
ing the requirements of the incentive (as seen in the memory 
data), were not able to allocate an appropriate amount of at-
tentional resources to the problem solving task. These find-
ings are inconsistent with Charron and Koechlin (2010) who 
found that participants switched their attentional resources 
based on the value of the incentive. Perhaps this is due to the 
differences in complexities of the tasks that were being per-
formed. In Charron and Koechlin participants were asked to 
switch between similar letter sequencing tasks which asked 
participants to judge whether two successively presented let-
ters are also in immediate succession in the word “tablet” on 
each trial. In contrast, in the current study participants were 
presented with complex word problems that not only require 
memory but also the ability to find a correct representation 
of the task, the ability to implement potential solution steps, 
and the ability to focus and sustain ones attention on the task. 
It is therefore possible that an incentive when multitasking is 
only effective in directing attention when the brain is engag-
ing in less cognitively complex tasks. Future research needs 
to be done to investigate the role that task complexity plays in 
the relationship between incentives and multitasking.
Furthermore, this study was designed to investigate the 
impact of a dual-task situation and an incentive on memory 
for problems. Results showed that overall the incentive in-
creased participants’ memory for problem details. The in-
centive increased problem recall for both the single and the 
Table 4. 
Mean irrelevant information scores for incremental and insight problems (standard deviations in parentheses) in the single and 
dual-task incentive and non-incentive conditions.
Incremental Insight Overall
Single Task
Non-incentive (n = 80) .20 (.33) .28 (.32) .24 (.26)
Incentive (n = 80) .16 (.29) .21 (.28) .18 (.24)
Total (n = 160) .18 (.31) .24 (.30) .21 (.25)
Dual Task
Non-incentive (n = 80) .13 (.26) .23 (.32) .18 (.24)
Incentive (n = 80) .21 (.34) .33 (.35) .27 (.29)
Total (n = 160) .17 (.30) .28 (.33) .23 (.27)
Figure 5. 
Mean irrelevant information score for the single and dual-task 
conditions for participants either given an incentive or not. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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dual-task condition despite overall recall being lower in the 
dual-task than in the single-task condition. These findings 
indicate that participants given an incentive in the dual-task 
condition are able to allocate some resources to the problem 
solving task which led to an increase in memory. This is quite 
surprising in light of the problem solving accuracy results 
indicating an increase in problem solving only for the single 
task condition. In order to fully understand these findings 
though, the memory results for the irrelevant information in 
each problem need to be considered. It was found that partici-
pants given an incentive in the dual-task condition recalled 
more irrelevant pieces of information than participants not 
given an incentive. These findings indicate that an incentive 
in a multitasking situation may lead to more surface process-
ing of a problem instead of deeper processing needed to solve 
complex word problems. These findings are consistent with 
Foerde, Knowlton, and Poldrack (2006) that showed that a 
dual-task condition disrupted activity in the medial temporal 
lobe, which is associated with more declarative learning, but 
did not change the activity in the striatal area, which is as-
sociated with habit learning. In addition, Foerde, Knowlton, 
and Poldrack argued that habitual learning associated with 
activation in the striatal area is much less flexible in its use, 
such that it is not as easily applied in different situations. It 
is therefore possible that participants given the incentive in 
the dual-task condition switched to more habitual or surface 
type processing (perhaps reading the problem over and over 
again) which led to the increase in overall memory. This type 
of processing, however, cannot be used to differentiate be-
tween relevant and irrelevant pieces of information, which in 
turn led to lower problem solving success compared to partic-
ipants in the single-task condition. Similar results can be seen 
in Ricks and Wiley (2014) were suspected surface processing 
did not impact memory for a baseball cover story but reduced 
learning of statistics concepts within the cover story. 
Our results are also consistent with Ophir, Nass, and Wag-
ner (2009) that found evidence for greater irrelevant infor-
mation processing among media multitaskers. As discussed 
above, heavy multitaskers showed greater susceptibility to 
distraction from irrelevant information in the environment 
and from irrelevant representation in memory. It is possible 
then that the more often one engages in multitasking the 
more readily the brain uses surface or habitual type process-
ing, which ultimately leads to decrements in performance.
The current studies’ findings of greater surface processing 
may also speak to the increasing number of studies investi-
gating multitasking that have shown a disconnect between 
an individual’s actual multitasking ability and their meta-
cognitive judgment about their ability. Several studies using 
closed-circuit driving tasks found that participants recog-
nized that their driving suffered when performing a second-
ary task (such as mental arithmetic, digit recognition, or a 
guessing game) but that their estimates of decrement did not 
correspond well to their actual decrements (Horrey, Lesch, 
& Garabet, 2008, 2009; Lesch & Hancock, 2004). Similarly, 
Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros-Ward, and Watson (2013) 
found that participants tend to overestimate their general 
ability to multitask, relative to others. Investigating pre-
performance predictions, Finley, Benjamin, and McCarley 
(2014) found no relationship between participants predicted 
and actual performance decrements on a visual task while 
performing and auditory secondary task. Based on the re-
sults of the current study, it is possible that motivation may 
play a role in participants’ faulty metacognitive judgments. 
As seen in the dual-task condition, an incentive (motiva-
tion) led to an increase in surface processing of the problems 
which in turn led to greater overall memory. It is possible 
that when individuals are motivated this increase in surface 
processing is misinterpreted when making metacognitive 
judgments about performance. Perhaps participants that are 
more motivated see their efforts to be more effective than 
they actually are, leading to a disconnect between actual abil-
ity and estimates of ability. Future studies should be designed 
to test this possibility. 
inSight verSuS inCreMental ProbleMS
Throughout this experiment both incremental and insight 
problems were used to investigate possible differences in how 
the concurrent tone monitoring task might affect these types 
of problems. Lavric et al. (2000) found negative effects of a 
secondary task on what they labeled as an incremental prob-
lem (Wason card selection task) but not on what they labeled 
as an insight problem solving (Duncker’s candle problem). 
Our results do not replicate these findings; instead the sec-
ondary task reduced both incremental and insight problem 
solving. It is possible that our findings did not replicate the 
results of Lavric et al. because of the difference in the insight 
problem solving tasks that were used across the two studies. 
Insight problem solving has been proposed to occur in three 
stages: search for an initial problem representation, reach-
ing an impasse, and restructuring the problem representa-
tion. Ash and Wiley (2006) found that participants’ ability 
to control attention (as measured through working memory 
capacity) predicted successful insight problem solving that 
required both a successful search phase and restructuring 
phase for problem solving success. Ability to control atten-
tion, however, did not predict success on those problems that 
only required successful restructuring. Given that problem 
solving success for Duncker’s candle problem mostly hinges 
on the successful restructuring of the function of the box of 
tacks, while the insight problems used in the current study 
require participants to both search for an initial representa-
tion as well as successfully restructure the problem space, it 
is possible that a secondary task designed to tax attentional 
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resources will have a different impact on these different types 
of insight problems. Indeed DeCaro, Van Stockum, and Wi-
eth (under review) found that participants’ level of working 
memory (and therefore the ability to control attention) influ-
ences insight problems that emphasize these stages of prob-
lem solving differently. In addition, it is also possible that, by 
including irrelevant information in each problem, we altered 
the problem solving processes associated with these prob-
lems. Therefore, comparisons between the data in this study 
and other studies using incremental and insight problems 
may be more difficult. Further research needs to investigate 
this possibility.
It is also possible that our results differ from Lavric et al. 
because of the differences in the secondary tasks. Murray 
and Byrne (2005) found a relationship between insight prob-
lem solving success and participants ability to switch their 
attention but not measures of sustained attention and selec-
tive attention. Lavric et al. used a secondary tone task where 
participants were asked to count the number of target tones 
while our participants were asked to respond by pressing a 
foot pedal in response to a target tone. Perhaps the second-
ary task used by Lavric et al. required more sustained and 
selective attentional processing while the secondary task in 
the current study relied more heavily on switches in atten-
tion (i.e., participants were switching between pressing the 
foot pedal for the tone monitoring task and problem solving 
more so than between the tone counting task and problem 
solving). Future studies should be conducted to disentangle 
the relationship between different type of insight problems 
and the different secondary tasks used.
ConCluSionS
Overall, the current study shows that an incentive was not 
able to increase problem solving success in a multitasking sit-
uation. Instead providing an incentive seemed to encourage 
more superficial or habitual processing, resulting in greater 
memory for irrelevant problem components. This indicates 
that educators and employers should think twice before 
using incentives to discourage students and workers from 
multitasking. It is possible that incentives may even further 
add to decreases in performance by leading to faulty perfor-
mance judgments. Perhaps by encouraging more targeted 
metacognitive processing (see Belenky & Nokes, 2009 for an 
example) distracted multitaskers can be encouraged to de-
vote more of their attentional resources to one task at a time. 
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aPPendix
Text and solution rates of the incremental and insight prob-
lems. The added irrelevant information is shown in bold.
inCreMental ProbleMS 
Practice problem: Dinner Party Problem (solution rate: 89%, not included in 
any analyses)
Mary won’t eat fish or spinach, Sally won’t eat fish or green 
beans, Steve won’t eat shrimp or potatoes, Alice won’t eat 
beef or tomatoes. If you are willing to give such a bunch of 
fussy eaters a dinner party, which items from the following 
list can you serve: green beans, creamed codfish, roast beef, 
roast chicken, celery, and lettuce.
Age Problem (solution rate: 65%)
Ann is twice as old as her son. They were both born in June. 
Ten years ago Ann was three times as old as her son. What 
are their present ages?
Water Problem (solution rate: 36%)
Given containers of 163, 14, 25, and 11 ounces, and a source 
of unlimited water, obtain exactly 77 ounces of water (1 mil-
liliter = .034 ounces).
Job Problem (solution rate: 51%, not included in any analyses)
Lebrun, Lenoir, and Leblanc are, not necessarily in that or-
der, the accountant, warehouseman, and traveling salesman 
of a firm. The salesman, a bachelor, is the youngest of the 
three. Lebrun, who is Lenoir’s son in law, is taller than the 
warehouseman. Who has what job?
inSight ProbleMS
Month Problem (solution rate: 46%)
What occurs once in June and twice in August, but never oc-
curs in October regardless if you are looking at a Gregorian 
or Julian calendar?
Matchstick Problem (solution rate: 26%)
Correct the arithmetic statement expressed in Roman nu-
merals by moving a single matchstick from one position 
in the statement to another. Remember putting a smaller 
number in front of a larger number means subtraction.
XI = III + III
Prisoner Problem (solution rate: 61%, not included in any analyses)
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found 
in his cell a rope that was half long enough to permit him to 
reach the ground safely. He divided the rope in half, tied the 
two parts together, and escaped. How could he have done this?
